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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000016

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

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SUBJECT: UNMIS POLICE AND MILITARY CONTINGENTS STRUGGLE TO
INTEGRATE WITH AU

Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Poloff and CDA Hume met with UNMIS Darfur Military Staff Chief and UNMIS Civ/Pol Director on January 1 and 3 to gain a very early assessment of the UN-AU lash-up. The picture for Civ/Pol is encouraging, for the military far less so. Civ/Pol Director reported a smooth integration with his AU counterpart; they will be co-located and have already discussed where he believes the small UN contingent can add value to the overall mission, several officers commented that the mission is not well defined and will take months to develop any clarity. On the military side, the UNMIS Military Chief said he met with the AU Force Commander briefly before the latter went on leave and did not get a sense that he would part of the team. He was told there was not room for him or his officers in the AU command group so they will be located in another building (UN security regulations may preclude this until either waivers are granted or better physical security measures are in place). End Summary

¶2. (U) See Septel for CDA's comments and recommendations.

¶3. (C) Darfur based S/CRS Poloff met with South African Colonel Thinus Van Staden, UNMIS Military Staff Chief (strictly protect), and Gambian Inspector General Landing Badjie, UNMIS Darfur Civ/Pol Chief on January 1. Ambassador met with Van Staden and Badjie again on January 3 as well as Planning Officer Immanuel Egunyorkin a trip to Darfur.

Good Initial Integration of Civ/Pol into AU

¶4. (C) Badjie has been in Sudan since October and brought the first contingent of 10 UNMIS Civ/Pol to Darfur last week; an additional 12 will arrive in the next week to 10 days. He has begun the process of integration with the AU Civ/Pol, which number over 1,400. Badjie said that he will be physically co-located with his AU counterpart, Police Commissioner Moenyana from South Africa, who has been very accepting of his help and has provided space for him by shifting officers around. Badjie suggested that he would effectively serve as the co-director of the joint Civ/Pol mission. Poloff met with Badjie at his UNMIS office, which he said was set up for the officers only until they have work stations at the AU, which they hope will be ready in the next week. He described a full partnership with the officer,s various counterparts.

¶5. (C) Badjie said he sees his role as offering observations and new ideas to how the AU Civ/Pol operate. His first

observation and suggestion was on how the Civ/Pol officers are assigned, which he believes is not being done to maximize the skills and background of the respective officers. He also sees recommendations forthcoming on how to improve training and implement a better community policing program throughout the camps. Of the 33 officers in the light package, eight will remain in El Fasher and the rest will provide a leavening for the force in the field. Badjie said that he believes the Force Commander does not understand the mission or the value of Civ/Pol and has not been supportive or attentive to their work. He believes the Force Commander may try to argue against the need for the Civ/Pol from the heavy support package. Badjie's initial assessment is that the numbers of the AU Civ/Pol are far too low for the mission and that they lack the material support to be effective in terms of patrolling and night operations. They need more communications, transportation, and overall resources. Badjie also mentioned that he understands some of the foreign police units that were designated may not be coming, and he fears a loss of effectiveness as a result.

16. (C) In discussions with five members of the Civ/Pol force itself -- from Sweden, Uganda, Jordan, and Gambia, Poloff was told that the officers do not have a clear picture of how they will fit in to the Civ/Pol force structure and anticipate many months before the UN officers are fully integrated and have clarity of mission. But they also said they can see ways in which the force can be more dynamic and will push for greater effectiveness when they are deployed to their respective sectors. They understand that the AU Force Commander is the main impediment to increased effectiveness and will block most initiatives. They expressed dismay that one individual could cast such a negative pall over a mission, which they said is palpable.

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Force Commander the Problem with Military Integration

17. (C) The initial experience of the military contingent was the polar opposite of their Civ/Pol counterparts in terms of integration. Colonel Thinus Van Staden of South Africa is the Military Staff Chief for UNMIS in Darfur. He arrived last week after several months in a holding pattern in Khartoum with 11 officers from the light package. He conveys a very determined and professional demeanor, the kind of officer who will not be easily dismissed. Van Staden said that immediately upon his arrival he sought a meeting with the Force Commander, but was told the General did not have time to see him until after his upcoming vacation. Van Staden insisted and was given a brief office call with no indication of where he would fit into the command group structure or how the two would work together. He believes the Force Commander's plan is to string the UN officers along for as long as possible -- country and mission briefings, meetings, etc. -- before giving them something to do. Even then he does not see an easy integration into the existing force structure. The natural position for Van Staden would have been Chief of Staff, a post which was open, but the Force Commander filled it with another officer from the existing AU force. Van Staden said that the Force Commander has also made clear that there is no space for the officers in the AU command group building and they will need to find office space elsewhere.

18. (C) Van Staden seemed to take all of this in stride as something he had been expecting. He sees his job as one of reporting back on the situation and knows that absent a change in Command Group attitude the AU-UN integration cannot proceed effectively. But he also knows this is a decision that will be made between New York, Addis and Washington, not in El Fasher. Van Staden expressed the importance of having a leavening of European and North American officers in the UN force. He believes if all the officers are from African and

South Asian nations they will be co-opted by the existing AU force and will not affect any positive change. This is especially the case with African officers where there are senior officers already in the AU force. What Rwandan officer would be in a position to make waves, he said, knowing that the Deputy Force Commander, whom he will presumably have to deal with the rest of his career, is from Rwanda? Van Staden has heard rumor that some of the Europeans have decided not to fill their commitments -- Norway recently pulled its two off the list -- and he believes it will be difficult to be effective if this trend continues. He noted that there are two U.S. officers on the light package list and said he looks forward to their arrival.

HUME